The transition from communism to capitalism following the revolutions of 1989 was unprecedented.1 Generally speaking, post-Communist states suffered a transformation crisis in moving from state socialism and a planned economy to a free and global market, resulting in hyperinflation, unemployment, and lower standards of living. Why was this?
Judt sees the post-Communist states as embracing the new neoliberal ends and means, but experiencing problems in the execution of said means—specifically, “the real issue was how to dispose of resources.”2 The disposition of resources was hijacked by formerly Communist elites who exploited privatization for personal gain. Berend has a similar emphasis on execution, although on a larger scale: “Technological and structural adjustments were the central elements of the transformation, the end and the essence of it.”3 Both Judt and Berend’s diagnoses can be traced to an underlining structural problem that has its roots in the Communist state. Ultimately, the post-Communist market transformation failed because it was still in the shadow of the Soviet structures. Politically, the elite remained in power, and were even more unchecked in their crime and corruption. Economically, the post-Communist states only changed on a superficial level, while keeping in essence the same inefficient and top-down structure as before. What was needed was a break—whether from foreign aid and investments or domestic political actions did not matter—but such a break did not occur. Instead, the corruption of the Soviet was passed on to its successors states. Russia will be used as the primary example here to examine the structural progression (or lack thereof) of Eastern Europe and its relationship with the political economy.
Judt provides an implicitly structural context for the post-Communist government. He sees it as a continuation of the Communist structure; though the Party was gone, Party members (i.e. the intelligentsia, bureaucracy and nomenklatura) were the only ones who had the necessary managerial experience and knowledge, and hence survived to lead the post-Communist state.4 The same structural nepotism and corruption that characterized the Communist governments could flourish again, but for greater stakes now. While Judt explores the political context, Berend provides an economic context, going back to the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s, which he sees as the result of structural and technological failures. A clear parallel can be seen between the Communist and post-Communist state in their failure to structurally adjust in the face of economic crises. Here, the unwillingness of the Communists to tackle the root can be seen; as Brown concurs, the “reforms” emphasizing consumerism in the 1970s were simply an attempt to placate the masses and avoid true structural reform.5 The problem for Yeltsin was that he inherited a structurally corrupted Russia, in “almost complete social and economic anarchy.”6 Peter Murrel’s evolutionary theory for post-Communist economic transition observed that the large state enterprises failed to adapt to the new conditions, and that such an inertia was to be expected, as “the old cannot be simply destroyed and therefore the radical reform plans have serious problems of coherence.”7 Hence, the post-Communist economy should be seen in the context of a structural history of political, economic and technological failures arising from the crises of the 1970s: “Needless to say, the one-and-a-half-decade-long economic crisis did not end with the collapse of the regime in 1989.”8
Using the dismissive term of a “market-economic romance” from Russian Premier Chernomyrdin in 1994, Judt nonetheless posits that it and its neoliberal goals of liberalization, privatization, and access to the EU were universal in post-Communist Europe.9 The question for Judt was not of the ends, but of the means. Interestingly, Reddaway and Glinksi refute such a point, seeing shock therapy in Russia as a top-down and authoritarianism initiative with virtually no public discussion—similar in means then, as the Communist command economy structure.10 Judt sees post-Communist governments as having two possible means: the “big bang” or “shock therapy” approach, a radical and rapid transformation to a free and capitalism economy, versus the “gradualism” approach, where inefficient sectors were dismantled and social benefits were prolonged.11 This is not strictly true, as Berend notes, both Romania and Russia opted for a “third away” and resisted privatizing strategic sectors.12
By and large, shock therapy was the preferred approach. Gradualism, which Berend argues as a more stable policy, was rejected by international financial institutions and Western governments, formalized under the Washington Consensus policy package, “the neo-liberal package with all of its economic and political content uniformly determined the policy of the governments of Central and Eastern European countries, and indeed most of the new political elite enthusiastically accepted and realized it.”13 These post-Communist states were suddenly forced back into the world market for the first time since WWI, and without modern political, economic and managerial structures, obviously could not compete with industrialized nations either in foreign or domestic markets.14 Crucially, this foreign intervention did not mean aid or investments. Indeed, a $27 billion pledge from 24 countries to assist economic stabilization and restructuring was simply never paid.15 Likewise, Judt sees foreign investment as resembling the tiny WWI private-sector investment rather than the sustained foreign aid given to Western Europe following WWII.16 This led to a transformation crisis, where entire industries collapses, industrial output and living standard declined, while unemployment, poverty and inflation soared. The former Soviet Bloc would need 20 years to reach its 1989 income level.17
Of course, the post-Communist economic reforms can be seen as an attempt to tackle the structural problems—but with the continued existence of the greater political and economic structures inherited from the Soviets, such reforms would be exploited and rendered useless. For example, Russia was still using its archaic banking structure that continued to extend credit to bankrupt firms.18 Therein lies an important difference between West and East Europe: capitalism in West Europe emerged over four centuries with the necessary laws and institutions to prevent its exploitation.19 Capitalism in East Europe often occurred overnight, and were ripe for abuse by a small elite familiar with Soviet misconduct. This exploitation was perhaps exemplified in Russia, where privatization turned into kleptocracy, as insiders with political clout cornered the markets through corruption.20 Indeed, Åslund calls these insiders “the scourge of transition,” as elite rent-seekers sought to prolong, complicate and exploit the transition process for as long as possible.21 In a sociological analysis of the Soviet system, Reddaway and Glinksi examine the middle class as dependent on the public sector, effectively leading to their economic and political demise following shock therapy and hyperinflation.22 Small privatization did however lead to the structural rise of the service sectors, although this paled in significance to the rise of the oligarchs and the destruction of the middle class.23
Without the necessary structure to support it, Yeltsin’s shock therapy did not create a middle class but a small oligarchic elite. Reform resulted in soaring prices and plunging living standards, but on a macroeconomic level, the monthly turnover increase from $18 million to $1 billion while foreign reserves went from $100 million to $1.5 billion.24 Despite this (or perhaps because of this), Yeltsin was losing support from regional leaders and his own party, eventually leading to the end of “market romanticism” in Russia. More so than any other country, Russia was the successor of Soviet structure and thought. The level of corruption, the failure of democracy, and the lack of Russian identity in the post-Communist state would lead to a new surge in nationalism and nostalgia.25 Following Yeltsin, Putin’s decidedly authoritarian approach and massive popularity has more in common with the Soviet style than the neoliberal one. It could be argued that in the end, the transformation crisis and structural failures of post-Communist Russia only cemented the shadow of the Soviet.
Åslund, Anders. How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Berend, Ivan T.. Europe since 1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Brown, J.F.. The Grooves of Change: Eastern Europe at the Turn of the Millennium. Durham: Duke University Press, 2001.
Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945. New York: The Penguin Press, 2005.
Reddaway, Peter, and Dmitri Glinski. The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy. Washington: Institute of Peace Press, 2001.
Remnick, David. Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia. New York: Random House, 1997.
1 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York 2005), 685.
2 Ibid., 688.
3 Ivan T. Berend, Europe since 1980 (Cambridge 2010), 200.
4 Judt, Postwar, 688.
5 J. F. Brown, The Grooves of Change: Eastern Europe at the Turn of the Millennium (Durham 2001), 62.
6 David Remnick, Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia (New York 1997), 107-108.
7 Anders Åslund, How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia (New York 2007), 43-44.
8 Berend, Europe since 1980, 196.
9 Judt, Postwar, 688.
10 Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinksi, The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism against Democracy (Washington: 2001), 232-233.
11 Judt, Postwar, 686-687.
12 Berend, Europe since 1980, 200-201.
13 Ibid., 198.
14 Berend, Europe since 1980, 196-197.
15 Ibid., 202.
16 Judt, Postwar, 690.
17 Berend, Europe since 1980, 199.
18 Ibid., 199.
19 Judt, Postwar, 689.
20 Berend, Europe since 1980, 199.
21 Åslund, How Capitalism was Built, 48.
22 Reddaway and Glinski, The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms, 27-29.
23 Berend, The Grooves of Change, 201.
24 Remnick, Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia, 45-46.
25 Judt, Postwar, 693-694.